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A CCA SECURE CRYPTOSYSTEM USING MATRICES OVER GROUP
RINGS
DELARAM KAHROBAEI, CHARALAMBOS KOUPPARIS, AND VLADIMIR SHPILRAIN
Abstract. We propose a cryptosystem based on matrices over group rings and claim
that it is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.
1. Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem
The Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem is a generalization of ElGamal’s protocol. It is prov-
ably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA). Moreover, the proof of
security relies only on a standard intractability assumption, namely, the hardness of the
Diffie-Hellman decision problem in the underlying group (see [2], [3]), and a hash function
H whose output can be interpreted as a number in Zq (where q is a large prime number).
An additional requirement is that it should be hard to find collisions in H. In fact, with
a fairly minor increase in cost and complexity, one can eliminate H altogether.
1.1. Definition of provable security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.
A formal definition of security against active attacks evolved in a sequence of papers by
Naor and Yung, Rackoff and Simon, Dolev, Dwork and Naor. The notion is called chosen
ciphertext security or, equivalently, non-malleability. The intuitive thrust of this definition
is that even if an adversary can get arbitrary ciphertexts of his choice decrypted, he still
gets no partial information about other encrypted messages. For more information see [2],
[3].
We define the following game, which is played by the adversary. First, we run the
enryption scheme’s key generation algorithm, with the necessary input parameters. (In
particular, one can input a binary string in {0, 1}n, which describes the group G on which
the algorithm is based.) The adversary is then allowed to make arbitrary queries to the
decryption oracle, decrypting ciphertexts which he has chosen.
The adversary then chooses two messages, m0 and m1, and submits these to the en-
cryption oracle. The encryption oracle chooses a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts mb.
The adversary is then given the ciphertext, without knowledge of b.
Upon receipt of the ciphertext from the encryption oracle, the adversary is allowed to
continue querying the decryption oracle. Of course the adversary is not allowed to submit
the output ciphertext of the encryption oracle.
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Finally, at the end of the game, the adversary must output b′ ∈ {0, 1}, which is the
adversary’s best guess as to the value of b. Define the probability that b′ = b to be
1/2 + (n), (n) is called the adversary’s advantage, and n ∼ |G|.
We say the cryptosystem is CCA-2 secure if the advantage of any polynomial-time
adversary is negligible. Note that a negligible function is a function that grows slower
than any inverse polynomial, n−c, for any particular constant c and large enough n.
1.2. The Cramer-Shoup Scheme.
Secret Key: random x1, x2, y1, y2, z ∈ Zq
Public Key:
group G; g1, g2 6= 1 in G
c = g1
x1g2
x2 , d = g1
y1g2
y2
h = g1
z.
Encryption of m ∈ G: E(m) = (u1, u2, e, v), where
u1 = g1
r, u2 = g2
r, e = hrm, v = crdrα, where r ∈ Zq is random, and
α = H(u1, u2, e).
Decryption of (u1, u2, e, v):
If v = u1
x1+αy1u2
x2+αy2 , where α = H(u1, u2, e),
then m = e/u1
z
else ”reject”
1. Theorem: [2] The Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem is secure against adaptive chosen ci-
phertext attack assuming that (1) the hash function H is chosen from a universal one-way
family, and (2) the Diffie-Hellman decision problem is hard in the group G.
2. A CCA-2 secure cryptosystem using matrices over group rings
In [4], the authors proposed a public key exchange using matrices over group rings.
They offer a public key exchange protocol in the spirit of Diffie-Hellman, but they use ma-
trices over a group ring of a (rather small) symmetric group as the platform and discuss
security of this scheme by addressing the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and Computa-
tional Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problems for that platform.
Here we propose to use a similar platform and show that a scheme similar to the
Cramer-Shoup scheme is CCA-2 secure. Our protocol is as follows:
Secret Key: random x1, x2, y1, y2, z ∈ Zn
Public Key:
3× 3 non-identity matrices M1,M2 ∈M3×3(Z7[S5]) such that M1 is invertible and
M1M2 = M2M1
c = M1
x1M2
x2 , d = M1
y1M2
y2
h = M1
z.
Encryption of a message N ∈M3×3(Z7[S5]): E(N) = (u1, u2, e, v), where
u1 = M1
r, u2 = M2
r, e = hrN, v = crdrα, r ∈ Zn is random, and
α = H(u1, u2, e).
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Decryption of (u1, u2, e, v):
If v = u1
x1+αy1u2
x2+αy2 , where α = H(u1, u2, e),
then N = (u1
z)−1e (Note that u1 is invertible since M1 is chosen to be invertible.)
else ”reject”
Remarks: M1 must always be chosen to be an invertible matrix, whereas M2 is just any
matrix such that M1M2 = M2M1. One must also decide what group Zn to use, i.e., n
must be specified.
3. Adaptive CCA security for matrices over group rings
We aim to show, by using Theorem 1, that if for invertible matrices over M3×3Z7[S5]
the DDH problem is hard, then the previously mentioned cyrptosystem is secure against
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. More formally,
2. Theorem:The Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem using the semigroup G = M3×3Z7[S5] is
secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack assuming that (1) the hash function H is
chosen from a universal one-way family, and (2) the decision Diffie-Hellman problem is
hard in the group G.
Before beginning the proof of the theorem we need the following two experimental facts.
(1) Given an invertible matrix M ∈ G = M3×3Z7[S5] and random integers a, b and
c ∈ N, it is not possible to distinguish between the distributions generated by
(Ma,M b,Mab) and (Ma,M b,M c).
(2) Given an invertible matrix M ∈ G = M3×3Z7[S5] and a random integer a, it is
not possible to extract information about a from Ma and M . In other words, the
distributions generated by a random matrix N and Ma are indistinguishable.
We offer the following two experiments as evidence for the plausibility of the above
facts. For these tests we used invertible matrices over the group ring M3×3Z7[S5]. For the
first we chose a random invertible matrix M (see section 3.1.1) and random integers a, b
and c ∈ N. We choose a and b in the interval [1022, 1027) and c in the interval [1044, 1054)
so that ab and c were roughly of the same size. For each pair of resulting matrices Mab
and M c we counted the frequency of elements of S5 appearing in each entry.
Repeating this 500 times for randomly chosen a, b and c, we obtained a frequency
distribution of elements of the group ring in each entry of the two matrices. From this we
created the QQ-plots for each of the 9 matrix entries. QQ-plots are a quick and easy way
to test for identical distributions, in which case the plots should be straight lines. As we
can see from Figure 1, it appears that from the generated distributions it is not possible
to distinguish DH pairs from non-DH pairs.
For verification of the second fact, we conducted a similar experiment, except in this
case, for each of the 500 draws we varied all parameters N , M and a. We again generated
QQ-plots as shown in Figure 2, and these show that no information about a is leaked from
publishing M and Ma.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2. The proof will proceed in a similar fashion as
Cramer-Shoup’s original proof. We will begin by constructing an algorithm D to attack
the DDH assumption. This algorithm relies on a probabilistic polynomial time adversary
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Figure 1. DDH results for M c vs. Mab
Figure 2. Results for Ma vs. N
A attacking our scheme, which succeeds with probability p, PA(Success) = p. Denote
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by DH the set of valid Diffie-Hellman tuples (M1,M2,M
r
1 ,M
r
2 ), and by R the set of all
random tuples (M1,M2,M3,M4). Then the algorithm is constructed as follows:
• D receives input (M1,M2,M3,M4) from DH or R
• Pick x1, x2, y1, y2, z ∈ Zn and a universal one-way hash function H
• The adversary A receives the public key, PK, which is
(M1,M2, c = M
x1
1 M
x2
2 , d = M
y1
1 M
y2
2 , h = M
z
1 , H)
• The adversary picks two messages m0,m1 and publishes them
• D picks b ∈ {0, 1} and passes to A
(M3,M4,M
z
3 ·mb,Mx1+αx23 My1+αy24 ),
where α = H(M3,M4,M
z
3 ·mb)
• With this information A tries to determine b and returns its guess b′
• If b = b′ return “DH”, else “R”
The proof is then verifying that this algorithm cannot attack the DDH problem. It is
built from the following three claims.
Claim 1: |P(D = DH|DH)− P(D = DH|R)| < . This claim is trivially true since D
is a PPT algorithm and the DDH assumption holds as verified previously.
Claim 2: P(D = DH|DH) = PA(Success). If we are given a DDH tuple, then all
decryption queries succeed for A. Hence the output of A will match the choice of b with
PA(Success).
Claim 3: |P(D = DH|R) − 12 | < . Since P(D = DH) = P(A = b), the proof of this
claim relies on the proof of two pieces. We need to show that for all decryption queries
where u1 = M
r1
1 and u2 = M
r2
2 with r1 6= r2, the decryption verification fails with non-
negligible probability. In addition to this, we must also show that assuming all invalid
decryptions fail, the adversary A does not learn any additional information about z.
We first start with the latter piece. If all invalid decryptions fail, then the only additional
information A receives is when valid decryptions are performed. Thus, at the onset of the
attack A only has information available that is given to him from PK, namely h = M z1 . If A
submits a valid ciphertext (u′1, u′2, e′, v′), where u′1 = M r
′
1 , then A obtains that h
r′ = M z
r′
1 .
However, based on the results above, if we denote M = M z1 , then h
r′ = M r
′
and the
distributions of any random matrix N and M r
′
generated by r′ are indistinguishable,
hence nothing is revealed about z.
Furthermore, from the encryption information passed to A, the only additional informa-
tion A has is M z3 ·mb, which leaves him with obtaining information from M z3 and M z1 , i.e.
solving a Diffie-Helmann problem, which we assumed was difficult in our scheme setup.
We are now left with showing that decryption almost always fails for invalid ciphertexts.
Suppose that the adversary submits an invalid ciphertext, (u′1, u′2, e′, v′) 6= (u1, u2, e, v).
Then we have the following cases:
Case 1: If (u1, u2, e) = (u
′
1, u
′
2, e
′) and v 6= v′, then the hash values α and α′ will be
the same, however decryption will certainly be rejected.
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Case 2: If (u1, u2, e) 6= (u′1, u′2, e′) but a = a′, then this means that A has found a
collision in H. But we assumed H was collision resistant, and since A runs in polynomial
time, this can only happen with negligible probability.
Case 3: If H(u1, u2, e) 6= H(u′1, u′2, e′), then we have the following system of equations
where we denote by log = logM1 and w = log(M2), and u1 = M
r1
1 , u
′
1 = M
r′1
1 , u2 = M
r2
2
and u′2 = M
r′2
2 :
log c =x1 + wx2(1)
log d =y1 + wy2(2)
log v =r1x1 + wr2x2 + αr1y1 + αwr2y2(3)
log v′ =r′1x1 + wr
′
2x2 + α
′r′1y1 + α
′wr′2y2.(4)
These equations are linearly independent as can be verified by looking at
det

1 w 0 0
0 0 1 w
r1 wr2 αr1 αwr2
r′1 wr′2 α′r′1 α′wr′2
 = w2(r2 − r1)(r′2 − r′1)(α− α′)
The above determinant is nonzero since we are considering bad decryptions and hence
r1 6= r′1, r2 6= r′2, α 6= α′.
Therefore, almost surely any bad decryption queries of this form will be rejected.
Thus we have shown from Claim 3 that the adversary A is unable to correctly determine
b given a random tuple, which we saw is equivalent to our algorithm not being able to
distinguish a random tuple from a DH tuple when given a random tuple. This together
with Claim 1 shows that our algorithm cannot distinguish between tuples no matter what
the input was. And finally, from Claim 2, we get that the adversary is unable to attack
our scheme with an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. 
3.1. Parameters for the Cramer-Shoup-like scheme using matrices over group
rings. Here we address two problems relevant to key generation in our scheme, namely,
(1) how to sample invertible matrices and (2) how to sample commuting matrices.
3.1.1. Invertible matrices. Sampling invertible matrices can be done using various tech-
niques. The first method is to construct a matrix which is a product of elementary
matrices,
M =
n∏
i=1
Ei,
where Ei is any elementary matrix from M3×3(Z7[S5]). Elementary matrices can be of
one of the three types below. In the matrix Ti(u), the element u should be invertible in
Z7[S5].
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Ti,j =

1
. . .
0 1
. . .
1 0
. . .
1

Ti(u) =

1
. . .
1
u
1
. . .
1

Ti,j(v) =

1
. . .
1
. . .
v 1
. . .
1

We can then easily compute M−1 as
M−1 =
n∏
i=1
E−1n−i+1
The drawback of generating an invertible matrix this way is that we do not have a good
grasp of the randomness embedded in this process. In particular, how large must n be
to generate a truly random matrix? Given that there are 3 different types of elementary
matrices, does it matter in what order they are multiplied in and does the number of ele-
mentary matrices of each form matter? These are questions that have not been addressed
and may influence the final invertible matrix generated in unknown ways.
Here, instead of the previously mentioned method of sampling random matrices, we
propose an alternative solution. We start with an already “somewhat random” matrix,
for which it is easy to compute the inverse. An example of such a matrix is a lower/upper
triangular matrix, with invertible elements on the diagonal:
M =
u1 g1 g20 u2 g3
0 0 u3
 .
Constructing the inverse of this matrix involves solving a matrix equation,
M ·M−1 = I
⇒
u1 g1 g20 u2 g3
0 0 u3
 ·
u−11 g4 g50 u−12 g6
0 0 u−13
 =
1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1

⇒ g4 = −u−11 g1u−12
g5 = u
−1
1 g1u
−1
2 g3u
−1
3 − u−11 g2u−13
g6 = −u−12 g3u−13 .
We then propose to take a random product of such invertible upper and lower triangular
matrices. Since these matrices are more complex than elementary matrices, it seems
reasonable to assume that we arrive at a more uniform distribution sooner than by simply
using elementary matrices. In our experiments we used a product of 20 random matrices,
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where each term of the product was chosen randomly as either a random invertible upper
or lower triangular matrix.
As mentioned previously, the benefits of this method are that inverses are easy to
compute and that the chosen matrix already has a large degree of randomness built in. In
particular, any element of Z7[S5] can be used off the diagonal, and any invertible elements
of the group ring can be used on the diagonal. These of course include elements such as
nu ∈ Z7[S5], where u ∈ S5 and n ∈ Z7.
Finally, we note that the order of the group GL3Z7[S5] of invertible 3× 3 matrices over
Z7[S5] is at least 10313. Indeed, if we only count invertible upper and lower triangular
matrices that we described above, then we already have (7 · 120)3(7120)3 ∼ 10313 matrices.
3.1.2. Commuting matrices. Now that we have sampled an invertible matrix (M1 in our
notation – see Section 2), we have to sample an arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily invertible)
matrix M2 that would commute with M1.
Given a matrix M1 ∈ G, define M2 =
∑k
i=1 aiM
i
1, where ai ∈ Z7 are selected randomly.
Then clearly M1M2 = M2M1. A reasonable choice for k is about 100 as this would yield
7100 ∼ 1085 choices for M2, which is a sufficiently large key space.
3.1.3. Other parameters. As mentioned in the introduction of the Cramer-Shoup algorithm
adapted to our group rings, we need to specify the value of n for Zn. Based on experiments
in our previous paper [4] we suggest n ∼ 10100. This seemed a reasonable choice of
exponent since it both allowed quick computations and ensured that the power a matrix
was raised to could not be figured out by brute force methods alone.
We also use a hash function H in our algorithm as did Cramer and Shoup. The only
requirement on H is that it is drawn from a family of universal one-way hash functions.
This is a less stringent requirement than to be collision resistant. The latter implies that it
is infeasible for an adversary to find two different inputs x and y such that H(x) = H(y).
A weaker notion of second preimage resistance implies that upon choosing an input x, it
is infeasible to find a different input y such that H(x) = H(y).
It should be noted that in their paper Cramer and Shoup also give details of their same
algorithm without requiring the use of any hash functions. The modified algorithm is only
slightly more complicated but relies on the same principles.
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